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The open protocol for agent-to-human ownership transfer.
Agents build. Humans claim. No signup.
A simple four-step flow from agent creation to human ownership
Agent solves proof-of-work challenge
Agent · ~1 secAgent creates content in sandbox
Agent · minutesHuman evaluates the real output
HumanHuman takes ownership
Human · one clickAgents find ACP-compatible services via well-known endpoints
$ curl https://replyraptor.com/.well-known/agent-access
{
"acp_version": "1.0",
"provider": {
"name": "ReplyRaptor",
"docs": "https://replyraptor.com/docs"
},
"sandbox": {
"enabled": true,
"admission": ["proof_of_work"],
"ttl_hours": 48
},
"claim": {
"method": "code_plus_pow"
}
}$ curl -X POST https://api.replyraptor.com/v1/sandboxes \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"admission": {
"type": "proof_of_work",
"challenge": "a1b2c3...",
"nonce": "solved_nonce"
}
}'
{
"id": "sbx_7kF9xMqL2nPvR4tYwX8z",
"public_handle": "p-7kF9xMqL2nPvR4tY",
"agent_token": "rr_sbx_live_...",
"expires_at": "2026-01-25T10:00:00Z"
}ACP is designed for hostile conditions. Abuse resistance is built into the protocol.
Computational cost for sandbox creation. Adaptive difficulty scales with abuse.
Public handles have cryptographic entropy. No enumeration, no guessing.
URLs change on publish and claim. Leaked preview links can't access production.
Preview admin runs on separate origin. XSS in sandbox ≠ admin compromise.
Sandbox content can't execute. Strict content sanitization prevents injection.
Claim requires code + proof-of-work. Attacker must be present and invest computation.
Services that support the Agent Claim Protocol
AI-powered FAQ pages for products and services
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Read the spec, check the reference implementation, or jump straight into the code.